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In Fall 2000, the electoral process and high technology collided
with the information super-highway. The collision was brought on by
a tight presidential race and an equally tight fight for third party
recognition. Given the importance of every single vote, citizens were
looking for creative ways to 'update' the Electoral College. Stemming
from Jamin Raskin's article, "Nader's Traders,"' a slew of websites
popped up one month before the election, facilitating the idea of
Internet vote-swapping.2
Heralded as a new forum for political organization and
participation, the websites linked third party supporters in critical
swing states to supporters of Democratic candidate Al Gore in
Republican and Democratic strongholds.' By exchanging votes, the
parties could help Gore win the Electoral College while at the same
time helping Nader's Green Party achieve its goal of getting five
percent of the popular vote, the threshold required to qualify for
matching federal campaign funds.' For example, a Gore backer in a
state not projected to be close (such as New York, where Gore led
Bush by a wide margin, or Texas where Bush would likely win)
agrees to vote for Nader; meanwhile, a Nader supporter in a state
where the outcome is in doubt (e.g., Florida) agrees to vote for Gore.
In the end, the closeness of the race has not altered Nader's vote
count, and Gore has come one vote closer to winning a swing state.
The websites implemented this process by allowing interested
persons to submit their e-mail addresses and voting preferences for
inclusion in a database that would link them with others for
1. Jamin Raskin, Nader's Traders, Slate Magazine (Oct. 24, 2000).
2. See e.g. <http://www.nadertrader.org> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001); <http'//
www.nadergore.com> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001); <http://www.tradevotes.com> (accessed Jan. 10,
2001) (based in Germany); <http://www.voteswap2000.com> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001); <http:II
www.votexchange.com> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001); <http://www.votetrader.org> (accessed Jan.
10, 2001); <http://www.winwincampaign.org> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001); <http://
www.voteswapportal.com> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001). For similar but non-swapping sites, see
also <http://www.voteauction.com> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001); <http://www.votepact.com>
(accessed Jan. 10, 2001); <http://www.virtualvotefomader. com> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001);
<http://www.greensforgore.coni> (accessed Jan. 10, 2001).
3. See Raskin, supra n. 1.
4. See id.; see also Debra Goldman, Election 2000: Stuck in the Middle with
Nowhere to Go, Adweek Eastern Edition (Nov. 13, 2000) (Swapping allowed some
individuals to transform voting from a zero-sum game, in which one player's gain requires
another's loss, into a non-zero-sum game, a win-win scenario, if you will.).
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individual communication.' On these websites, software programs
would scan the databases to match citizens with compatible voting
agendas.6 Each person for whom the software generated a match
would receive the e-mail address of a matched partner Any
subsequent pronouncements between the two matched persons
regarding the intent to vote for specific candidates would be, by
definition, hortatory but not mandatory or even remotely enforceable
or verifiable.'
This scenario is itself a product of new technology, for such
swapping could not have been done in a wholesale manner before the
Web's communication network.' Consider that within a span of two
weeks, millions of 'hits' and several thousand voter 'matches' were
recorded on the popular sites.' ° But, with technological advance
comes conflict, and before long the sites and their participants were
being accused of vote bribery," a crime punishable by up to three
years imprisonment per violation."
Whether we label this emerging phenomenon an 'innovative
campaign technique' or 'illegal brokering of votes' might initially
seem unimportant, since the election is over. 3 However, with many
players already contemplating voting strategy for the next
5. See e.g. <http://www.votexchange.org/vote002.html> (accessed Jan. 21, 2001).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.; see also Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1323, 1327
(2000)(The secret ballot virtually eliminates the ability to verify.). The only exception to
this would be with absentee ballots. For example, 'swappers' could verify their signed and
marked absentee ballots via Internet digital video. However, California Elections Code
section 18403 bars such conduct: "any person who other than an elections official or a
member of the precinct board who receives a voted ballot from a voter or who examines
or solicits the voter to show his or her voted ballot is punishable by a fine,.., by
imprisonment,.., or both." Cal. Elec. Code § 18403 (West 2000).
9. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (discussing the easy access and
vast communication capabilities of the Internet).
10. See <http://www.votetrader.org/result/html> (accessed Jan. 21, 2001) (vote
swapping results of combined sites: estimated 2.8 million hits, 36 thousand participants, 16
thousand swaps).
11. See e.g. <http://www.aclu.org.news/2000/nll0200.html> (accessed Feb. 12, 2001)
(As a result of a letter threatening prosecution, sent by California Secretary of State Bill
Jones to Voteswap, that website and two others decided to shut down on the week of
October 30.).
12. See e.g. Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522 (West 2000).
13. See Cal. v. San Pablo & T.R. Co, 149 U.S. 308 (1893); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal.
3d 716 (1971).
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'4presidential election , as well as for its use in other voting forums," a
significant and justiciable controversy is fully alive 6
This Note argues that Internet vote-swapping should be
considered legal under California law. By analyzing the applicable
statutes' text, structure, judicial precedent, and policy, the first part
of this Note shows that the practice of pledging votes is beyond the
statutory scope. The second part of this Note focuses on the
Constitutional effects of reading the law proposed in California to
cover the practice of pledging. In particular, this Note analyzes the
three justifications behind vote bribery laws 7 and applies them to the
case at bar, concluding that a state's interest in such a law does not
correlate with a prohibition of vote-trading. As a result, the current
enforcement of the law unreasonably encroaches on First
Amendment rights of speech and association. 8
II
Background
In every state and federal election, no matter where one is
located, the use of "expenditures"' 9 or "valuable consideration"2 to
14. See <http://www.aclu-sc.org/news/releases/20001127voteamendedcomplaint. html>
(accessed Feb. 24, 2001) (The owners of votexchange.com explained their registration of
the domain name 'votexchange2004.com' as follows: "The regular nature of elections and
of third party candidates means that the threat to our civil rights will likely recur. Thus,
until a court sets a precedent, the issue will come up again and again in future elections.");
see also <www.winwincampaign.org> (accessed Feb. 24, 2001) (By Bush winning, our
determination is only intensified to "strike blows for the progressive agenda in the years
ahead."). Thus, the discussion of Nader and Gore is only a vehicle for vote-swapping, as it
will potentially recur.
15. See Siobhan Gorman, Lessons from the Nader Traders, The National Journal
(Jan. 6, 2001) (The theory of vote trading could also be used to swap political support
between, for example, environmental groups and labor groups, which often agree on
trade issues.).
16. San Pablo, 149 U.S. at 308 (regarding mootness).
17. See Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1325 (The rationales are equality, efficiency, and
inalienability.).
18. The second prong's analysis is less extensive than the first, as the current case
on this issue, Porter v. Jones, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 8929 (May 1, 2000), was recently
dismissed from federal court, stressing that the case concerns California elections law. See
Leslie Simmons, Vote Swapping, City News Service (Feb. 20, 2001).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1994) (Federal law imposes a fine or imprisonment on
anyone who "makes or offers to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate," as well as on anyone who
"solicits, accepts, or receives any such expenditures in consideration of his vote or the
withholding of his vote.").
20. See e.g. Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522 (common state law term).
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bribe or influence a fellow registered voter's actions at the polls are
illegal.2' Laws prohibiting core vote bribery, for example the explicit
bidding for voters' ballots,22 must rank among the least controversial
election laws in the United States. 3 However, in the context of
Internet co-operative voting, the application and validity of anti-
bribery laws is much trickier. The lawfulness of such sites and their
use hinges on interpretations of sparsely worded bribery statutes.
Consider federal law first. It states that votes cannot be traded
for "expenditures."24  The Justice Department confirmed the
narrowness of this statute in noting that "expenditures" refers
exclusively to things of "monetary value-money, a welfare voucher,
or a TV set, for example., 25 Consequently, activities like "vote
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 597. Every state prohibits the practice as well. See generally Ala.
Code § 11-46-68 (1999); Alaska Stat. § 15.56.030 (Michie 1999); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1006
(1999); Ark. Code Ann. § 7-1-104 (Michie 1997); Cal. Elec. Code § 18522 (West 1999);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-10-1524 (1998); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-333x (1997); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 15 § 4940 (1998); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.061 (West 1998); Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-570
(1998); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 19-3 (1999); Idaho Code § 18-2305 (1998); 10 11. Comp. Stat. §
5/29-1 (West 1999); 1998 Ind. Adv. Legis. Serv. § 3-14-3-19; Iowa Code § 722.4 (1997);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2409 (1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.205 (Michie 1998); 1998 La.
Acts § 18:1461; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 602 (West 1998); Md. Code Ann. § 13-602 (1998);
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 56 § 32 (West 1999); Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931 (1998);
Minn. Stat. § 211B.13 (1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-889 (1998); Mo. Rev. Stat. §
115.635 (1999); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-101(1)(a) (1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1536
(1998); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293.700 (Michie 1998); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40
(1999); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-25 (1999); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-20-11 (Michie 1998); N.Y.
Elec. Law § 17-142 (Consol. 1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-275 (1999); N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-14-03 (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.02 (Anderson 1999); Okla. Stat. tit. 26
§ 16-106 (1998); Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.665 (1997); 25 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 3539 (1998); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 17-23-5 (1998); S.C. Code Ann. § 7-25-60 (1998); S.D. Codified Laws § 12-
26-15 (1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-126 (1999); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.03 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-601 (1998); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 2017 (2000); Va. Code Ann. §
24.2-1007 (1999); Wash. Rev. Code § 29.85.060 (1999); W. Va. Code § 3-9-13 (1999); Wis.
Stat. § 12.11 (1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-26-109 (1999).
22. See e.g. U.S. v. McCranie, 169 F.3d 723, 726 (11th Cir. 1999) (Each of the two
camps set up tables inside the courthouse, where supporters of both sides bid against each
other to buy absentee votes.).
23. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982) (Justice Brennan writes "no body
politic worthy of being called a democracy entrusts the selection of leaders to a process of
auction or barter.").
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 597; see also 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1994) (repealed) (defining
"expenditure" as including "payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of
money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement to make an
expenditure, whether or not legally enforceable); U.S. v. Bruno, 144 F. Supp. 593, 596
(C.D. Ill. 1955).
25. U.S. v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1983) (The court held that the term
only included paying cash, and like items, such as welfare food vouchers, in exchange for
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trading," which do not involve the "offering of any pecuniary
inducements," are outside the proscribed conduct addressed by the
"vote buying and selling law."26 Thus, while Janet Reno emphasized
that buying or selling votes is illegal under federal law, the swapping
of votes is not; in fact, it is no different from "U.S. senators who swap
votes on legislation."27
Though federal vote bribery law may not extend to Internet
vote-pledging, the regulation of elections is primarily left to the
states.28 Here, the state statutes provide broader definitions of
corrupt voting practices.29 According to California's Elections Code,
whose language is similar to that employed by most states," it is a
crime for one to offer, receive, or agree to offer or receive any
"money, gift, loan, or other valuable consideration" in exchange for
one's vote for "any particular person or measure."31
a vote.).
26. Andrew Cain, 'Nader Traders' Shut Down Their Website under Pressure,
Washington Times (Nov. 1, 2000) (quoting Justice Department); see also Jeremy Derfner,
Is Vote-Swapping Legal? Slate Magazine (Nov. 1, 2000) (The Justice Department
explains, "a vote does not have a tangible monetary value."); Eugene Kiely, Nader, Gore
Backers Going Online to Swap Votes; California Pulls Plug, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
(Nov. 1, 2000) (The Justice Department says vote-swapping is legal as long as no money is
exchanged.); Patricia Jacobus, Should Voters be Barred from Trading Votes?
<http://www.cnetnews.com> (accessed Jan. 28, 2001) (Justice Department states that,
"the key to something being legal is a pecuniary inducement to stimulate voting.., in
other words money.").
27. Washington Associated Press, Justice Wary of Election Fraud, Telegraph Herald
(Nov. 3, 2000).
28. See Or. v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-29 (1970) (noting that the Framers of the
Constitution intended the States to keep the power to regulate elections to themselves);
see generally U.S. Const. art. II.
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 597.
30. See id.
31. Those sections provide in pertinent part:
Section 18521 Receipt of Consideration for Specified Vote
A person shall not directly or through any other person receive,
agree, or contract for, before, during or after an election, any money,
gift, loan, or other valuable consideration, office, place, or
employment for himself or any other person because he or any other
person:
(a) Voted, agreed to vote, refrained from voting, or agreed to
refrain from voting for any particular person or measure.
Any person violating this section is punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison for 16 months or two years.
Section 18522 Giving of Consideration to Influence a Vote
Neither a person nor a controlled committee shall directly or
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In the context of Internet vote-swapping, people are agreeing to
vote or refrain from voting for particular candidates based on their
exchanged vote pledge.32 The related statutes are clear that agreeing
to vote or refrain from voting for a specific candidate is illegal only if
one is "induced" by "valuable consideration." Thus, the legality of
the swap-sites and their participants' conduct depends on whether an
exchanged pledge to vote constitutes as such.33
A lack of judicial precedent has left many states reading the
same language as having quite different meanings.34 In fact, Oregon
even switched sides twice within the span of a few months. 5 In
California, however, where many of the prominent websites are
based, the Secretary of State made his stance clear: "A vote itself is
valuable consideration," and, as a result, "you cannot sell it, you
cannot trade it, you cannot barter it, you cannot exchange it. You can
vote it."36
If such a stance can indeed be supported by a liberal reading of
through any other person or controlled committee pay, lend, or
contribute, or offer to pay, lend, or contribute, any money or other
valuable consideration to or for any voter or to or for any other
person to:
(a) induce a voter to:
(2) Vote or refrain from voting at an election for any particular
person or measure. Any person or candidate violating this section is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or two
or three years.
Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522.
32. See Raskin, supra n. 1.
33. Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522.
34. David Connery-Marin, Nader-Gore Vote Swapping is Deemed Legal in Maine,
Portland Press Herald (Nov. 1, 2000) (quoting Maine Secretary of State Gwadorsky
deeming sites legal); Cain, supra n. 26 (Nebraska's Secretary of State agrees that,
although it may not be "right," there is "no illegal activity in this one."); Lynda Gledhill,
California Shuts Down Vote-Trader Web Site, San Francisco Chronicle (Oct. 31, 2000)
(Missouri and Texas agree with California.); Scott Harris, Vote Green - Somewhere Else,
The Industry Standard (Nov. 13, 2000) (Minnesota, Arizona and Wisconsin follow
California.).
35. See e.g. Jeff Mapes, Bradbury Says Vote Trading Sites OK, The Oregonian
(Nov. 4, 2000) (Oregon's Secretary of State, Bill Bradbury, reversed himself about
whether vote swapping violates state law.).
36. Scott Harris, Voteswap2000.com Elects to Shut Down, The Standard (Oct. 31,
2000) (quoting the Secretary of State's chief counsel, William Wood); see also
<http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/11/transcript/bop.voteswap> (accessed Jan. 28, 2001)
(quoting William Wood).
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the state's provision, then another legislative conflict awaits: the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.37 Government restrictions on speech in
the electoral process are essentially problematic as they strike at the
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect - political
speech. 8 Therefore, at a minimum, a state must show a justifiable
effort that their law, which may restrict certain speech (i.e., bribery),
balances the need to minimize undue influence in elections with the
desire to encourage and facilitate maximum political participation
and discussion.39 In determining this balance, this Note will analyze
whether the state's reasoning for stifling the speech that forms vote-
bribery rationally applies to that of Internet vote-swapping.4"
III
Analysis
A. Internet Vote-Swapping Is Beyond the State's Statutory Scope
Considering non-binding pledges to vote, which of course are
virtually unverifiable in the modern era of secret voting," the phrase
"valuable consideration" can have far reaching effects. Such an
encompassing definition implicates many current legal practices that
voters and candidates participate in each year. 2 For example, even a
simple situation with spouses 3 exchanging pledges to vote on certain
school board issues could potentially label the family as criminal
37. See E.H. Schopler, What Provisions of the Federal Consitution's Bill of Rights
are Applicable to the States, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1388 (1999) (discussing why the First
Amendment and other Bill of Rights provisions are applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
38. See Brown, 456 U.S. at 52-53.
39. See Kusper et al. v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
40. This Note excludes the formal First Amendment analysis, but rather only
focuses on whether a state can reasonably use the same rationales they justify stifling
bribery talk to justify stifling swap talk. See Memo of Points and Authorities, Porter v.
Jones, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 8929 (May 1, 2000) (executes a more formal and extensive
First Amendment argument about why Internet vote-swapping is core political speech,
and thus deserves both a showing of compelling interests by the state and minimal
encroachment on the right -for restriction to be justified).
41. See Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1327-28 (regarding how the secret ballot process
virtually eliminates the ability to verify a vote pledge).
42. See infra Part III(A)(3).
43. Scott Harris, In Vote-Swap Fight, ACLU Loses First Round, Infoworld Daily
News (Nov. 7, 2000) (William Wood, chief counsel for the Secretary of State, claims
"even such promises exchanged between spouses would be illegal.").
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conspirators." Because there are many questions of pragmatic
feasibility, the text, structure, and judicial precedent must be
analyzed to determine if the state's statutory interpretation is legally
convincing.
1. Precedent limits "valuable consideration" to material and
independent benefits
The American Civil Liberties Union and others have argued that
since there can be no verification of any of the promises being carried
out,45 or any "firm agreements,"'46 the unenforceable pledges are
beyond the statutory scope. Yet, the wording of the statute only calls
for "agreements to refrain from voting for any particular person,"
regardless if the pact is kept or not.4 ' Specifically, the fact that the
promise may not, or can not, be fulfilled is "immaterial"; it does not
"affect the illegality of the promise made." 8 Thus, it is purely a
matter of whether an unenforceable pledge to vote for a candidate
can be read as a commodity of value.
Though the California courts have yet to really face a similar
issue, the sister courts of Alaska, Oregon, and New York indicate
that the term "valuable consideration" implies a "material 4 9 and
"independent" benefit to the voter." The courts reasoned that the
word 'induce' in the statute "implies the promise to provide
something beyond what is involved in the act of voting; there must be
an advantage which has independent value to the voter."51 Thus,
when campaigners sent out envelopes not already pre-addressed52 and
gasoline vouchers53 in hopes of inducing voter turnout, the items were
44. See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522 (violating either section is punishable by up
to three years imprisonment).
45. See Memo of Points and Authorities, Porter v. Jones, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
8929.
46. <http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/11/transcripts/bot.voteswap.11.02> (accessed
Nov. 20, 2000) (without some sort of firm agreement, nothing is improper).
47. Cal. Elec. Code § 18521.
48. Stebbins v. White, 190 Cal. App. 3d 769, 787 (1987) (citing Bush v. Head, 154
Cal. 277, 283 (1908)).
49. N.Y. v. Cunningham, 88 Misc. 2d 1065, 1074 (1976) (The word consideration by
itself might well include a political benefit, but the phrase as a whole more naturally
implies a "material benefit.").
50. Dansereau v. Ulmer, 903 P.2d 555, 565 (1995) (citing Or. Republican Party v.
State of Or., 78 Or. App. 601,604-05 (1986)).
51. Id.
52. See Or. Republican Party, 78 Or. App. at 605.
53. See Dansereau, 903 P.2d at 565.
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independently valuable, and as such, deemed "valuable
consideration." The rationale being that free envelopes and gas are
items that have marketable value outside of merely helping to
"facilitate the recipient's exercise of the franchise." 4 They offer a
benefit to anyone who receives them, regardless if they participate in
the voting process or not.5 Consequently, they are items of "valuable
consideration.
56
However, in the vote-swapping context, the commodity is the
unverifiable potential vote itself. 7 Each party to the transaction
receives a promised vote for their preferred candidate, which
essentially translates to a one-vote enhanced chance that each
swapper's candidate will reach their goal. This, of course, is all a
registered voter normally receives when punching their chad
(assuming they punch the intended one) - a one-vote enhanced
chance their candidate will succeed. Thus, by exchanging a vote for a
vote, neither swapper acquires any value independent from what they
normally receive from the voting process itself. Accordingly, the
individual's voting decision is at most "facilitated" by matching and
discussion,58 rather than "induced" by "valuable consideration." 9
In any event, the case law establishes the possibility of multiple
rational readings of the statutes. 6° Regarding such statutory
ambiguity, the United States Supreme Court has often stated that:
when one of the statute's interpretations is harsher than the
other, we are to choose the harsher only when [the
legislature] has spoken in clear and definite language. [I]t
must be shown that his case is plainly within the statute. If
the [legislature] wants to go further, it must speak more
clearly than it has.6'
54. Or. Republican Party, 78 Or. App. at 605 (The court reasoned that the promised
advantage could not be something that flows from the performance of the act itself. Since
pre-addressed envelopes used for obtaining ballots are only valuable in facilitating one's




57. See Harris, supra n. 36 (The valuable consideration is the vote.).
58. See Cal. Elec. Code § 18521.
59. Id.
60. One being a broad facial view: people would pay money for votes, so a pledge of
one is a "valuable" commodity. The other is a more narrow view, tailored to the spirit of
bribery law: if it has no independent value, then it is not "valuable" consideration that is
inducing voters.
61. McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 359-69 (1987).
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In reference to the stated rule of lenity, California should, at a
minimum, first refer to its legislature to clarify the words
"inducement by valuable consideration" before labeling the swapping
of potential vote choices as bribery.
2. Classifying an unenforceable pledge as "valuable consideration"
is textually and structurally unsound
The phrase "valuable consideration" in this context is plagued
with "marginal indefiniteness [as to its] meaning and application."62
To help sharpen the focus, let us view the terms in light of their
coexistence with both the surrounding words of the statute, and the
neighboring code sections.63
First, unless the legislature had voiced otherwise,6' the common
understanding of a word or phrase is a logical reference for
interpreting a statute.65 Black's Law Dictionary defines "valuable
consideration" as "consideration that either confers a pecuniarily
measurable benefit on one party or imposes a pecuniarily measurable
detriment on the other."6 Keeping in mind that pecuniary generally
means monetary,67 a pledge to vote for a certain candidate would fall
outside of the phrase's scope. For that reason, California and others
are either misreading the statute, or they intended "valuable
consideration" to connote a larger meaning than the general legal
definition.
In scanning the surrounding words of California's statute, the
types of bribe inducements are listed as follows: "money, loan, or
other valuable consideration, office, place, or employment." 6 If we
assume the legislature intended such an expansive meaning of
"valuable consideration," one that incorporates unenforceable
pledges of votes, then was it necessary to include the additional three
items? 69 More likely, "valuable consideration" directly trails "money"
62. See William Alston, Vagueness, 8 Ency. of Phil. 218 (Edwards ed. 1967) (This
description defines the word "vagueness.").
63. Though this is not a "constitution we are expounding," history reveals this as a
helpful exercise in determining a logical meaning of vague or unambiguous phrases. See
McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
64. No legislative hearings discussing this issue could be found as of Oct. 24, 2001.
65. McNally, 483 U.S. at 359-69.
66. Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 7th ed. West 1999).
67. Id.
68. Cal. Elec. Code § 18521.
69. For example, office, place, and employment.
2001]
and "loan"7 because it is a catch-all phrase for any other type of
monetary or pecuniary inducement that may be used.71 Then,
subsequent to the monetary items, the code adds "office, place, and
employment" as a way to describe the other common bribery
category-occupational benefits."
Additionally, there are illogical consequences when the broad
definition is juxtaposed against neighboring statutes. Consider
section 18205, which makes it illegal to give or receive "valuable
consideration to induce a person not to become or withdraw as a
candidate."73
Let's assume that a large proportion of voters in a mayoral race
pledge their votes (by hypothesis, valuable consideration) for
candidate A early on.74 Is it not then possible that candidate B would
"withdraw, or not become a candidate" as a result?75 By offering an
overwhelming amount of pledges (via a census-like survey) for
candidate A, the voters could induce candidate B to back out of the
election. This could plausibly be felonious behavior under the broad
interpretation as a promise to vote (valuable consideration) for a
person to induce the withdrawal of another candidate. 6 Yet, the
legislature could not have intended to ban citizens from participating
in election surveys, for fear their answer results might influence a
candidate's choice to bow out.
If such a construal raises issues about both the applicable code,77
and other surrounding electoral law,78 then maybe the construal is in
conflict with the framing of an election bribery statute.
3. Pragmatically, many current political activities cannot legally
coexist with the expansive reading
If the pledged quid pro quo of votes is deemed illegal, then a
host of other common electoral practices, from legislative logrolling
70. Cal. Elec. Code § 18521.
71. See Alson, supra n. 62 (This interpretation is consistent with Black's definition
of "valuable consideration.").
72. See Cal. Elec. Code § 18521.
73. See Cal. Elec. Code § 18205 (West 2000).
74. This may occur through a common city-wide survey of registered voters for
example. As is often the case, the surveyor may even offer some small gift (candy or a
dollar) in exchange for volunteer's time spent filling out the questions.
75. Cal. Elec. Code § 18205.
76. Id.
77. See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522.
78. See Cal. Elec. Code § 18205.
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to campaign contributions, may be suspect of electoral corruption.79
At first glance, even a campaign promise that induces voters to
change their choice of candidate could be deemed bribery.8" Thus,
before accepting this reading of the statute, its crippling effect upon
other currently legal conduct must be explored.
Assume a hypothetical between legislators A and B. A wants to
get B's vote for his tax regulation, so he offers his vote for her
environmental regulation in exchange. Some call this process "vote
trading, horse trading, or logrolling,"8 but either way there is no
doubt that the exchange is functionally equivalent to the website
vote-swapping scenario. The only obvious differences are that, in this
hypothetical scenario, the votes are verifiable82 and stem from
legislators instead of ordinary citizens.83
Yet, conventional wisdom holds that legislative logrolling
properly occurs all the time.' For example, then Senator Al Gore
remarked in his 1992 book: "As a member of the Southern 'farm
bloc' in Congress, I have followed the general rule that I will vote for
the established farm programs of others in farm states, in return for
their votes on behalf of the ones important to my state.,
85
Not surprisingly, I failed to locate any reported cases of
prosecutions for logrolling in the legislature.86 It would seem that part
79. See Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1325.
80. Nonetheless, case law has specifically determined that so long as the candidate's
promise is within the "proper and lawful execution of his duties and prerogative of his
office" then such inducements are legal. Stebbins, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 786 (holding that a
candidate cannot lawfully promise to render a valuable service for a voter in return for his
vote when that service is unconnected with the proper discharge of an office-holder's
duties and responsibilities.); Bush, 154 Cal. at 283. However, when the promises are
tailored to narrow groups, the legality is more complex. See generally Hasen, supra n. 8.
81. Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1339. For an early political science discussion of American
logrolling, see Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government 370 (1908) and David B.
Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion 362-68 (Knopf
1965). Note, no one appears to refer to the process as "bribery" or "vote buying,"
suggesting perhaps a public perception that logrolling differs somehow from the core
vote-bribery situation.
82. Thus, unlike here, it is official that votes are actually traded.
83. Unlike a voter's single ballot, the legislature's vote has a far superior chance of
being decisive in the count.
84. Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1339.
85. Id. at 1339 (in reference to Al Gore, Earth in the Balance 340 (1992), quoted in
Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in Perspective on Public Choice Theory 322, 338 (Dennis
Mueller ed., 1997)).
86. There is one reported prosecution for logrolling in California. Yet this was not a
typical case, because the exchange involved personal, not political, benefits. See People v.
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of the reason for the lack of reported prosecutions is that society (or
at least prosecutors) may see legislative logrolling as beneficial, or at
least as legislative compromising behavior that is not worthy of
punishment.87 Indeed, "some states so tolerate legislative logrolling
that they expressly exempt the practice from their anti-bribery
laws. '"
Thus, if legislative logrolling is really as "American as apple
pie,"89 then we must ask ourselves how it can coexist with the
charging of citizens as felons who participate in virtually the same
activity.' Given the Secretary of State's past record in cracking down
on logrolling,91 Internet vote-swapping deserves a similar treatment
of legality and non-prosecution.
Political candidate-contributor exchanges are prey to the liberal
construction as well. It is possible to perceive campaign contributions
as a showing of how intense the donor's preference for a certain
candidate is.92 In return for the contribution, they are usually
promised (albeit, the promise may many times be implied) greater
access to the politician to express their views on issues that, if elected,
the politician may face as a legislator.93
If we follow the reasoning that an unenforceable pledge to vote
is "valuable consideration" that can induce one to "vote for a
particular candidate," then the campaign-contributor exchange is
suspect for the same reasons.94  Contributors receive the
unenforceable promise of preferred access to influence the candidate
Montgomery, 132 Cal. Rptr. 558, 562 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (The mayoral candidate
agreed to vote for another council member's legislation in exchange for that council
member's vote for mayor.); see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the
Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784, 814 (1985) ("Under our American
system open logrolling is normally characterized as bad, but no real stigma attaches to
those who participate in it... and, in fact, all our political organizations operate on a
logrolling basis.").
87. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 140 (1962) ("In fact, all of our political
organizations operate on a logrolling basis.").
88. Hasen, supra, n. 8, at 1340 (citing the Alaska Stat. § 11.56.130(2) as an
example).
89. Raskin, supra n. 1.
90. See Cal. Jur. 3d Elec. § 284 (2000) (most proscribed acts under sections 18521
and 18522 are felonies).
91. There seem to be no prosecutions to date, suggesting legality.
92. Hasen, supra, n. 8, at 1359-60 (Money seems to be a useful way to express
intensity of preference.).
93. Id.
94. Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522.
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(valuable consideration)95 in exchange for their contribution and vote.
Such a pledge, if deemed "valuable consideration," surely "induces"
individuals to vote and contribute "for a particular candidate."96
It is unmistakable that the potential to have influence on
political decisions is valued a great deal higher than the anticipation
of having a single vote, in return for your vote, cast in your
candidate's favor.97 In effect, unless the state renders the law as
applying to political contributions as well, campaign contributors can
implicitly buy more than what individual voters are forbidden to
98
swap.
Other common election practices may constitute felonious
behavior under the expansive construal as well. For example, two
spouses' or friends discuss their votes, realize they "disagree on
important issues, and agree that, since they're canceling one another
out, neither will vote."1" The mutual promise of a foreclosed vote by
each could be labeled an exchange of valuable consideration. In turn,
this consideration induces each other to refrain from voting for their
chosen topic or candidate. Consequently, an agreement to bribe was
formed, and the couple may be guilty of criminal conspiracy.
At any rate, with so many traditional forms of political activity in
jeopardy, the courts should consider the feasibility of policing all
these scenarios. Referring to Justice Marshall's words of
prudentialism, °' a court may want to reject a "construction... that
would render" the performance of government functions "difficult,
hazardous, and expensive.""
95. This hypothetical assumes that not only is an unenforceable pledge to vote
valuable consideration, but also an unenforceable pledge for enhanced involvement in
political processes. This is a conceivable assumption under the proposed California
interpretation.
96. Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18521-18522.
97. See Hasen, supra n. 8 (Access, in turn, affects political power.).
98. See Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and
the Voting Rights System, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1455, 1456 (1994).
99. Harris, supra n. 43 (Even such promises exchanged between spouses would be
illegal.).
100. See <http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nll0200.html> (accessed Feb. 12, 2001).
101. This basically entails a court considering the policy repercussions of a decision
before making it. See Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, J.M. Balkin, Akil Reed Amar,
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking (4th ed. Aspen L. & Bus. 2000).
102. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316.
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B. The Broad Interpretation Conflicts with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments' 3
In Brown v. Hartlage, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously pronounced: "A state has a legitimate interest in
upholding the integrity of the electoral process itself, but when a state
seeks to uphold that interest by restricting speech, the limitations on
state authority imposed by the First Amendment are manifestly
implicated."'" Here, the state's basis for restricting political web-
strategizing is that it is a form of vote-bribery.' 5 States generally
justify the restriction of speech that a vote bribery statute creates by
three rationales: equality, efficiency, and inalienability.' °6 Thus, to see
how reasonable a state's justification for stifling speech that forms
vote swaps, it may be helpful to examine the applicability of the vote-
bribery rationales.
1. The Equality Rationale
An equality argument for prohibiting the bribery of votes can be
summarized as follows: "The poor are more likely to sell their votes
than are the wealthy, leading to political outcomes favoring the
wealthy."' 7 The reason is intuitive: A dollar is worth more to a poor
person than to a rich person because people get greater value out of
initial dollars than later dollars.
The question then becomes whether vote-swapping violates
principles of political equality. Obviously, the concern about wealth
in the core vote-buying case is absent from vote-swapping."° At least
formally, all website participants are equal; in every election, each
voter has one vote to cast. "
However, the equality in participation and influence may still be
103. For an extensive and formal First Amendment argument on the legality of vote-
swapping see Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Porter v. Jones, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8929 (May 1, 2000).
104. Brown, 456 U.S. at 54.
105. See supra Part II(A); Brown, 456 U.S. at 55 (Vote-buying can be prohibited,
despite its restriction on speech, because it "remains in essence an invitation to engage in
an illegal exchange for profit.").
106. See generally Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1323.
107. Id. at 1325.
108. Id. (This economic principle is called declining marginal utility.).
109. Id. at 1343.
110. Id.; see also Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112
Harv. L. Rev. 434, 460 (1998) (No citizen has more input than any other.).
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controversial. If we look closer, only voters who "tilt toward the
margins" are able to trade votes."' For example, a Bush supporter
whose second choice was Gore, or vice versa, is not going to find any
trading partners."2 Accordingly, it would seem that certain voters do
not really have the equal opportunity to swap, as their voting
preferences leave them with no strategic match. In this light, since
only certain voters can beneficially participate, vote-swapping may
"ameliorate political inequality."".
Another argument towards inequality involves the Internet
requisite in facilitating vote-swapping. Many individuals do not have
a reasonable opportunity to participate in the swaps because they
lack access to the Internet. Indeed, even with more public computers
available,"' many less fortunate individuals lack the technological
literacy or Internet savvy necessary to match and exchange
information over a computer.
Thus, though a traditional poor-versus-rich inequality may not
be as apparent as in vote-bribery, there are alternative showings that
certain individuals may not be able to participate in pledging over the
Internet. Thus, the equality rationale seems to be at least relatively
applicable to stifling vote-swapping speech.
C. The Efficiency Rationale
An efficiency analysis puts aside equality questions and instead
asks whether the ban on vote-bribery increases or decreases overall
social wealth.' When votes are purchased, the risk exists that they
will be purchased in ways that ignore negative externalities, or ill
effects on the third parties."6 A classic example is if one buys votes to
capture government subsidies that were aimed at a more socially
productive use."'
Here, the greatest factor suggesting efficiency is the idea of
mutual gains from trade. Vote-swapping translates a one voter/one
vote regime that does not register intensity of preference very well
111. Jedediah Purdy, How To Go To The Polls Twice, N.Y. Times (Nov. 3, 2000).
112. Id.
113. Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1345 (citing Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and
Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 707, 721-732 (1991)).
114. For example, many public schools and libraries now offer free Internet-ready
computer services.
115. Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1331.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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into a regime that allows vote trades to express intensity."8 Assuming
fidelity, those who swap votes are able to express more, not less,
about their political views through one cast ballot."9
Yet, all the discussion thus far has assumed that the information
pledged, though unenforceable, is at least honest and accurate. It is
not hard to imagine a hacker inputting five thousand fake e-mail
addresses representing a certain geographically located voter
preference. This could have the effect of changing five thousand
matched voters' candidate choices come the day of elections. Such an
effect would surely not increase social utility, and would likely trigger
negative externalities to all who were defrauded.'2 °
However, this Note focuses on, as did the states, the legality of
swapping votes, not on the potential fraud opportunity the sites offer.
As such, the efficiency rationale is not very applicable to the honest
swaps of information. Of course, it is always important to keep
perspective. In fact, if Internet vote-trading were eventually
considered legal, the governments would have a strong inefficiency
justification for requiring state anti-fraud regulation of the
mechanisms.
D. The Inalienability Rationale
Finally, consider the interaction of inalienability and vote-
swapping.' The inalienability argument against vote buying goes as
follows: votes belong to the community as a whole and should not be
alienable by individual voters. 2 Under this theory, money should not
be brought into the voting scheme because society wants to
discouraging citizens from focusing their voting decisions solely upon
their own economic well-being."3 An "anti-commodification norm of
voting, driven by the inalienability of votes, serves the instrumental
purpose of promoting public-regarding voting."'2 4
The inalienability concerns with buying and selling votes are not
118. See William J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State 45 (2d
ed. 1965) (Log-rolling transforms voting from a procedure which takes into account only
ordinal preferences to one which can reflect the strength of feeling.).
119. See Purdy, supra n. 111 (This is the opposite of the effect of vote-buying.).
120. See Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1332.
121. See Gledhill, California Shuts Down Vote-Trader Web Site, San Francisco
Chronicle (Oct. 31, 2000) (quoting William Wood as saying "the vote is an inalienable,
fundamental legal concept").
122. See Hasen, supra n. 8, at 1335.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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present when it comes to swapping votes. There is no exchange of
money or other personal goods for votes as there is in core vote
bribery." Instead, votes are exchanged for other votes, reducing the
possibility of securing immediate economic benefits from voting.'26 To
quote Secretary Jones, "a vote is not a commodity," and as such,
when two people swap, their alleged public-regarding purpose in
voting is not corroded.'27 Given these political assumptions,'2
inalienability concerns do not counsel against the legality of trading
votes.
In closing, the state is relying on a probable showing of equality
to justify the illegality of Internet vote-swapping.29 This is a thin
branch on which to rest an argument against an encroachment of
"core First Amendment protection-political speech."'3°
IV
Conclusion
We once again learned from the 2000 election that there is no
such thing as a wasted vote. Yet, if the Electoral College survives the
debacle of the previous presidential election, then Internet vote-
trading, assuming honest and accuracy, can become a key instrument
in ensuring that a vote counts no matter its location. And though
vote-swapping cannot imminently help everybody, it may pressure
states to give voters a chance to refine their votes, by, for example,
forcing them to adopt a version of rank-order voting. In the
meantime, vote-swapping gives citizens a chance to say more
precisely what they think about the country's politics. This is good for
democracy.
125. Id. at 1336.
126. Id.
127. CNN, Burden of Proof <httpJwww.cnn.comf2000fLAW/11/transcripts/bop.voteswap>
(accessed Nov. 20, 2000).
128. See Hasen, supra n. 8 (In particular, inalienability assumes an anti-
commodification norm related to voting exists, and that this norm causes people to make
public-regarding decisions.).
129. Though inaccuracy concerns triggered the other rationales, states shut down
these websites because of the web-swapping, not because of the fear of deception. Thus,
this Note deals with the legality of vote-swapping itself, not the implications of such
websites.
130. Brown, 456 U.S. at 52.
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